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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PEOPLE V. SEARS-
THE GRAND JURY
The issue discussed in this paper arose from a controversy concerning
the conduct of various parties involved in a special grand jury proceeding
investigating the occurrence set forth below.
On December 4, 1969, at 4:45 a.m., pursuant to a search warrant for
possession of illegal guns, a raid was conducted by twelve Chicago police
officers and 2 members of the Cook County State's Attorney's office on
an apartment located in Chicago, Illinois. During the course of the raid,
gunfire broke out, and two members of the Black Panther Party then in
the apartment were killed, and four other occupants were wounded. Two
police officers were also injured.' In January 1970, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois impaneled a grand jury
to investigate the incident to determine if there had been a possible viola-
tion of the civil rights of the apartment occupants. 2 On May 15, 1970,
this federal grand jury issued a report, critical of the conduct of certain
police officers and other individuals involved in the raid but indicted no
one.3 Between May 29 and June 17, 1970, various interested individuals
and groups petitioned the circuit court for a special Illinois grand jury to
be impaneled to investigate the incident. In response, on June 26, 1970,
the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court, Joseph A. Power, stated that the
federal grand jury report raised "critical and unresolved questions con-
cerning violations of the Illinois criminal law by employees of the state's
attorney's office and employees of the Chicago Police Department."' 4 He
issued orders reciting jurisdiction to issue a special venire, 5 and he appoint-
ed Barnabas F. Sears0 as a special state's attorney to prosecute any mat-
1. Report of the January, 1970 Grand Jury of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, at 1.
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 242.
4. Order of June 26, 1970, at 5.
5. ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 78, § 19 (1969). "The judge of any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction may order a special venire to be issued for a grand jury at any time
when he shall be of the opinion that the public justice requires it. The order for
such venire shall be entered in the records of the court by the clerk thereof; and such
clerk shall forthwith issue such venire under his hand and seal of the court and
deliver the same to the sheriff, who shall execute the same by summoning . . .23
persons, qualified by law, to constitute a grand jury."
6. Barnabas F. Sears is a partner in the Chicago law firm of Boodell, Sears,
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ters arising out of the grand jury proceedings. 7 Sears presented a petition
to Judge Power that a special venire be issued, and on November 7, 1970,
Judge Power issued the venire for a special grand jury to be convened. 8
On December 7, 1970, the special grand jury was impaneled, received their
instructions from Judge Power, and retired to hear evidence.9
On April 22, 1971, Judge Power requested Sears to bring the special
grand jury with him into his court room.10 Judge Power then told Sears
that he wanted every witness who testified before the federal grand jury to
appear before this one, and instructed Sears to subpoena these people.
Sears said he would submit a list of those people not called to the grand
jury and leave the decision to the jury members. 1 The grand jury then re-
tired and voted not to call any witnesses not previously called. 12 The
witnesses were not subpoenaed, and on April 26, 1971, Judge Power once
more instructed Sears to bring the grand jury with him into his court
room. Sears offered him, for an in camera inspection, a list of the wit-
nesses not called and the reasons therefore, which Judge Power refused to
receive.13  The judge then ordered Sears, as an officer of the court, to
Sugrue and Crowley. He was admitted to the Illinois Bar in 1926 and the Bar of
the Supreme Court of the United States in 1937. In 1961 Mr. Sears served as
Chief Prosecutor of the State of Illinois in the Summerdale Police scandal, which
resulted in the conviction of all seven police defendants. See People v. Beeftink,
21 111. 2d 282, 171 N.E.2d 632 (1961).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 6 (1969). "Whenever the attorney general or
state's attorney is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested in any cause
or proceeding, civil or criminal, which it is or may be his duty to prosecute or de-
fend, the court in which said cause or proceeding is pending may appoint some
competent attorney to prosecute or defend such cause or proceeding, and the attor-
ney so appointed shall have the same power and authority in relation to such cause
or proceeding as the attorney general or state's attorney would have had if present
and attending to the same. . . . Such attorney so appointed shall possess all of
the powers and discharge all of the duties of a regularly elected state's attorney
under the laws of the State. . ....
8. Order of November 4, 1970.
9. The Grand Jury then held 55 half day sessions, heard approximately 55
witnesses, received approximately 144 exhibits and had before it a copy of the
January, Federal Grand Jury Report of May 15, 1970. Sears' affidavit to the court
in the April 26, 1971 proceeding, at 3-4; Brief for Appellant, p. 11.
10. Sears' affidavit to the court in the April 26, 1971 proceeding. Brief for
Appellant, p. 11.
11. A short time thereafter Sears related to the press that in his opinion, the
April 22, 1971 meeting should have been held in open court, for he believed the
court to be without power to instruct a grand jury in a secret session. Sears'
affidavit to the court in the April 26, 1971 proceeding at 4.
12. Sears' affidavit to the court in the April 26, 1971 proceeding at 3, Brief for
Appellant, p. 15.
13. This list, marked exhibit 1 in that proceeding, also contained the names of
those whose conduct was under investigation and were invited to testify, provided
they sign immunity waivers which they refused to do.
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present those uncalled witnesses. Sears refused, was held in contempt of
court,1 4 and then he appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
In the period of April 26 to April 30, 1971, various petitions' 5 were
filed with Judge Power by officers in the police department and state's
attorney's office, requesting an in camera hearing by the judge of the
grand jury's proceedings to determine if the jury had been tainted by ad-
verse publicity, to suppress any indictments pending this hearing, and to
dismiss the grand jury and quash any indictment if their proceedings were
tainted. On April 30, Sears motioned to dismiss these petitions on grounds
of lack of jurisdiction and standing. His motion, after oral argument,
was denied on May 17, 1971.
On behalf of certain members of the grand jury, the foreman requested
Judge Power to hold individual, in camera hearings with jury members
who wished to do so. Judge Power agreed to this on May 18, 1971. On
May 17, 1971, Barnabas Sears and various organizations"6 petitioned
the Illinois Supreme Court for a stay of proceedings, and for writs of
mandamus and prohibition to prevent Power from holding his in camera
hearing of the grand jury on an individual, or group basis, pending a re-
14. The fine for this contempt was placed at $50 per hour till Sears complied.
This was equal to the fee the state was paying him as special prosecutor.
15. On April 26, 1971, John Meade, a police officer under investigation, filed a
verified petition praying for a discharge based on articles appearing in Chicago
newspapers, specifically one in the Chicago Tribune which on April 27, 1971, re-
ported: "After gathering evidence and hearing testimony, the jurors reportedly had
agreed to indict several persons, but this was not enough to satisfy Sears and his
four assistants. Then . . . in reaction . . . the jurors . . . refused to indict any-
one. . . . [Slears in a last ditch effort to save his case, reviewed the evidence . . .
in a stormy session. Then, . . . the jury's response was to draw up a single bill of
indictment that named, among others, the two highest officials linked to the case.
In it Hanrahan was . . . listed as a defendant, and Conlisk was cited as an unin-
dicted co-conspirator. [T]he jury also named other high police officials and two
assistant state's attorneys. All . . . were indicted on charges of obstructing justice
in the investigation after the raid. This action . . . satisfied Sears. [W]hen . . .
presented to Judge Power, the judge balked . . . Judge Power . . . refused to sign
the indictment . . . and asked them to hear more witnesses, including Hanrahan,
who had refused an earlier invitation, but . . . is expected to testify today .... "
On April 27, 1971, Meade filed a second petition, unverified, to discharge the grandjury based on remarks made by an ABC-TV Channel 7 news commentator. These
remarks were retracted a short time thereafter.
On April 29, 1971, Richard S. Jalanec, James R. Meltreger and Sheldon Soron-
sky of the State's Attorney's office filed an unverified petition, repeating the sub-
stance of the two Meade petitions.
On April 29, 1971, twelve persons in the Chicago Police Department filed a verified
petition alleging in substance the same matters as the other three petitions.
16. These groups included the Chicago Bar Association; the American Civil
Liberties Union, Illinois Division; Businessmen for the Public Interest; Alliance to
End Repression; the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law; and the Chi-
cago Council of Lawyers.
[Vol. XXII
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turn of indictments, and to dismiss the petitions presented by the police
officers and members of the state's attorney's office.
The Illinois Supreme Court found, first in dealing with Judge Power's
order of April 26, 1971
that there may be circumstances under which the circuit court will have jurisdiction
to direct that witnesses be subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury . . . [But]
that such supervisory power be exercised only when failure to do so will effect a
deprivation of due process or result in a miscarriage of justice . . . [and] that the
circumstances shown here do not furnish a sufficient basis for the action of the court
and the order holding Sears in contempt for refusing to subpoena the witnesses is
therefore reserved. 17
The supreme court ruled with respect to the petitions for mandamus
and prohibition, that the court in its inherent supervisory power could,
on its own motion, make inquiry into a grand jury either in camera, or
via transcript, to determine if it had been tainted, thereby eliminating the
question of whether the police and state's attorney's officials had standing
to present the petition, or whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain
them before indictment. Accordingly mandamus was denied., 8
Finally, as to the private conferences with individual grand jurors, the
supreme court held that the "court has jurisdiction to meet in camera with
the grand jury" but a writ of prohibition will issue "to preclude in camera
communication between the court and individual grand jurors .... "19
Much publicity has been given to this grand jury investigation, most of
it centered around the charges that Sears, in his role as special prosecutor,
acted improperly to coerce the grand jury to return indictments against
various police and state's attorney's officials. One issue raised here-
whether the circuit court in its inherent supervisory power over the pro-
ceedings has jurisdiction to investigate, prior to indictment, allegedly im-
proper actions by the prosecutor conducting the hearing-is composed of
several seemingly settled points of law. The other, more significant issue
raised, concerns the April 22, 1971, order of Judge Power, that the grand
jury in their investigation will hear the witnesses the court demands they
hear. Although the finding of contempt against Sears for violating this
order was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court, the court did hold that
circumstances may exist under which "the circuit court will have juris-
diction to direct that witnesses be subpoenaed to appear before a grand
jury."'20 To appreciate the impact of this holding, and why the issues
17. People v. Sears, 49 111. 2d 14, 31, 273 N.E.2d 380, 389 (1971).
18. Id. at 36, 273 N.E.2d at 392.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 31, 273 N.E.2d at 389,
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raised in mandamus are of settled law, it is necessary to review the history
of the grand jury, focusing on two seemingly incompatible policies: the
independence of the grand jury from the court, and the inherent super-
visory power of the court over the grand jury.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to
an individual the right to an indictment by a grand jury "for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime."'21 But the procedural aspect of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause22 has not, as of yet, been extended to in-
clude this guarantee, and the states, therefore, are not required to adopt
the use of the grand jury procedure. 23 If a state decides to adopt the use
of the grand jury, there is no constitutional requirement that it be of the
type that existed at common law. 24 The state legislature is free to fully
adopt, modify, or even abolish the institution of the grand jury. 25
The original Illinois constitution makes no mention of the grand jury,26
but the first legislature of the state did not leave this matter open for long.
One of their earliest acts was that of February 4, 1819, which declared
that the "[c]ommon law of England, all statutes or acts of the British
Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of
King James I, . . . which are of a general nature . . .shall be the rule
of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by leg-
islative authority." 27  This legislative act meant the addition of the in-
stitution of the grand jury, as it existed at common law, as the principal
method of initiating criminal prosecutions in Illinois. 28 Indeed, the current
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger ....
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
23. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S.
314 (1892).
24. State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 40 P. 372 (1895), held that a general pro-
vision in a constitution for grand jury indictment requires that a grand jury be of the
type that existed at common law.
25. In re Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. 200, 4 A.2d 487 (1939), held that
in the absence of statutes modifying or restricting the grand jury, the fifth amend-
ment would apply and the grand jury of the common law is adopted.
26. See ILL. CONST. (1818).
27. Ill. Laws of 1819, at 3.
28. During the Constitutional Convention of 1870 the issue of whether to re-
tain or abolish the jury arose. A compromise settlement by the delegates left the
ultimate responsibility of abolishing or retaining the grand jury to the legislature, as
evidenced in the passage of ILL. CONST. art. II § 8: "No person shall be held to an-
swer for a criminal offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in
264 [Vol. XXII
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Illinois statutes recite under the section entitled Commencement of Pros-
ecutions: "All prosecutions of felonies shall be by indictment unless
waived understandingly by the accused in open court .... -29
Since no constitution or legislature has ever defined the common law
grand jury,30 it is necessary to reflect upon its history, both in England
and the United States, to determine its present status.
The origin of the grand jury can be traced back to the Saxon kings of
the 10th century or Norman conquerors of the l1th century.31  In this
early common law period the grand inquest or assize was developed. The
king's purpose in the adoption of this institution was to replace the ec-
clesiastical judges' practice of proceeding ex officio upon private sugges-
tions, with the assize's procedure of definite accusation by a sworn indi-
vidual to twelve lawful men summoned by the sheriff.3 2  In 1166 the
system was extended to the courts of the itinerate judges appointed by the
king,33 and in 1176, Henry II issued the Assize of Clarendon and the
Assize of Northhampton. It was comprised of sixteen men, twelve from
every 100 and four from the township, who under oath were required to
state whether they had knowledge of any crime. This group came to be
known as the "Grand Assize," or "jury of the hundreds," and an accusation
which the punishment is by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary,
in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army and navy, or in the mili-
tia when in actual service in time of war or public danger: Provided, that the
grand jury may be abolished by law in all cases." The response of the legislature
to this article has left the common law grand jury intact at present. See 2
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ILLINOIS, 1434-
1573 (1870), which contains discussions of the proponents and opponents of the
grand jury system's continued use.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2 (1969) on Commencement of Proceedings;
ch. 38, § 111-3(5)(b), requires the indictment to be signed by the foreman of the
grand jury. See also, PROPOSED ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1963),
confirming the place of the grand jury in the criminal procedure scheme.
30. People ex rel. Ferrill v. Graydon, 333 Il. 429, 432, 164 N.E. 832, 833
(1929). In discussing the history of the grand jury Mr. Justice Dunn stated: "No
act of the Legislature has ever attempted to define the grand jury. It had its origin
in the common law and has existed for many hundred years. Its Constitution, or-
ganization, jurisdiction, and method of proceeding were all well-known features of
the common law before the organization of the state of Illinois, and have been rec-
ognized and adopted in all our Constitutions and in legislation as it existed at the
organization of the state."
31. Henry II decreed its use for Normandy in 1159, and for England in 1164.
See 1 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 136-153 (2d
ed. 1968).
32. Id.
33. Under this system secret meetings were held by selected men, presided over
by the judge, who presented them with a list of crimes against the crown and re-
quested these "jurors" to state whether any person had been reputed to be guilty of
such an offense. See Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
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by them raised a presumption of guilt.34 These two institutions co-existed
until the reign of Edward III when the inquest of the hundreds gave way to
the countywide inquest.3 5 Their function was "to sit and receive indict-
ments, which are preferred to them .. . and they are only to hear the
evidence on behalf of the prosecution ... ; and the grand jury are to in-
quire whether there be sufficient cause to call upon the party to answer
it."' 36 By 1351, the grand jury and the trial court had become separate
institutions, although both were representatives of the king.37
The move toward independence of the grand jury came to a focal point
in 1681 with the Earl of Shaftsbury trial.38 A bill of indictment was
presented to the grand jury and the witnesses were examined in open
court. The crown demanded an indictment against the Earl from the
jury, ignoring their demand for a closed proceeding,39 to insure the jury's
secrecy in deliberations and vote, which the jury felt was their right
according to long established practice. The jury refused to return the
indictment and defiantly wrote the word "ignoramus" across the face of
the document. Ever since this act "it has been held an inviolable tradition
that they need follow the orders or instructions of the judge neither as to
what they consider nor as to whom they indict or fail to indict,"40 and to
insure the grand jury would not be hampered in their work by reprisals
from crown or accused, the rule concerning secrecy was founded.41
When the English settlers came to the North American shores they
brought with them this grand jury and "there is every reason to believe
that our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially
like its English progenitor. '42
The basic power of the grand jury is termed inquisitorial,43 and is
34. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-325 (3rd ed. 1922).
35. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 138 (1947).
The practice at the assize was to call the names of the county magistrates until
23 appeared, later good and lawful men were qualified to serve.
36. 2 SHARSWOOD, BLACKSTONES COMMENTARIES *301, 302.
37. BIGELOw, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 316, 317 (1880).
38. 8 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 759 (1816).
39. Id. at 771; (Foreman) "My Lord Chief Justice, it is the opinion of the jury,
that they ought to examine the witnesses in private, and it hath been the constant
practice of our ancestors and predecessors to do it; and they insist upon it as their
right to examine in private ....
40. U.S. v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 293-94 (N.D. Cal. 1952). Chief Justice
Fee commenting on the historical precedent of the Earl's trial.
41. See In re Kittle, 180 F. 946 (S.D. N.Y. 1910).
42. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
43. The exercise of these inquisitorial powers is best described by the historic
charge delivered a federal grand jury by Justice Field in 1872: Charge to the
[Vol. XXII
derived from the fact that the proceedings before the grand jury con-
stitute the only general criminal investigation known to the common law. 44
Its actual role, however, is one of greater breadth than a mere investigatory
body. The purpose of grand jury proceedings is to protect the citizen
"from an open and public accusation of crime and from trouble, expense
and anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established by
presentment or indictment of a grand jury."'45
The statutory provision with respect to the presentment of witnesses
before a grand jury is contained in a section of the Illinois criminal code
entitled Duties of Grand Jury and State's Attorney which recites: "The
Grand Jury shall hear all evidence presented by the State's Attorney. '46
The statutory provision with respect to the calling of a special grand jury
is found in section 19 of the Jurors Act which states:
Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 18, 992-94 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal.): "We, therefore,
instruct you that your investigations are to be limited: First, to such matters as
may be called to your attention by the court; or, second, may be submitted to your
consideration by the district attorney; or, third, may come to your knowledge in the
course of your investigations into the matters brought before you, or from your
own observations; or, fourth, may come to your knowledge from the disclosures of
your associates."
Legislative enactment has modified process for the Illinois statute (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 78, § 19 (1969)) requires that no grand juror shall make presentments
upon their own knowledge unless that information is known to at least two of their
number, except in cases where the single juror is sworn as a witness.
No mention is made of the "private prosecutor" in Field's charge. The private
prosecutor is defined as "one who sets in motion the machinery of criminal justice
against a person who he suspects to be guilty of a crime, by laying an accusation
before the proper authorities, and who himself is not an officer of justice." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 1386 (4th ed. 1951). This limits the power formerly exercised by
grand juries, for at common law the grand jury had the power to prefer indictment
at the insistence of a private prosecutor. People v. Sheridan, 394 Ill. 202, 181 N.E.2d
617 (1932). The issue of whether or not a private prosecutor could present to the
grand jury was laid to rest in People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524, 30 N.E.2d 11 (1940)
where Parker was held in contempt for improperly communicating directly with the
grand jury, the United States Supreme Court dismissing his appeal based on abridge-
ment of free speech.
44. Ward Baking Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 205 App. Div. 723, 200 N.Y.S.
865 (1923).
45. Shaw, C.J., in Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray (Mass.) 329, as quoted in L. OR-
FIELD, supra note 35, at 145. A countervailing view is expressed in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa., 1933), where the theme is expressed
that "[tihe inquisitorial power of a grand jury is the most valuable function which
it possesses today and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives the
accused, justifies its survival as an institution."
46. ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 38, § 112-4(a) (1969). This section is based on the
Revised Laws of 1827 § 175 which states: "In all complaints, exhibited before
the grand jury of any county, they shall hear the witnesses on behalf of the People
only." This remained in effect until the adoption of the present § 112-4(a) in
1963.
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The judge of any court of competent jurisdiction may order a special venire to be
issued for a grand jury at any time when he shall be of the opinion that public
justice requires it.4 7
To protect the grand jury and to allow it maximum freedom in its work,48
deliberations and vote, 49 the rule concerning secrecy has survived. 0 This
does not mean that a grand jury operates as an unchecked institution,
for it is still subject to the inherent supervisory powers of the court. The
rules of the circuit court 5t recognize that the circuit court judge has
"general administrative powers within the division. He requisitions and
impanels all grand juries . . . ,",52 grand jury summons are returnable
to him,5 3 and he appoints a Supervisor of Jurors. 54 The Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure not only recognizes this power, but authorizes judicial
inquiry into the proceedings of a grand jury. In Chapter 38, Section
112-6(b), the 1969 code recites:
Matters occurring before the Grand Jury other than the deliberations and vote of
any grand juror may be disclosed when the court, preliminary to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding, directs such in the interest of justice.
Another section of Chapter 38 reinforces this supervisory power. Section
114-(1)(a) states:
Upon the written motion of a defendant made prior to trial before or after a plea
has been entered the court may dismiss the indictment ... upon any of the follow-
ing grounds:
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 19 (1969). Even without statutory authority a
court has the authority to issue the venire for a special grand jury. People ex rel.
Ferrill v. Graydon, 333 Il. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929).
48. Id. See In re Kittle, 180 F. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
49. ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 38, § 112-6(b) (1969). "[M]atters other than de-
liberations and vote of a grand jury may be disclosed by the State's Attorney
solely in the performance of his duties."
50. People v. Goldberg, 302 Ill. 559, 564, 135 N.E. 84, 86 (1922), makes a good
statement of the rule on secrecy: "In furtherance of justice and upon grounds of
public policy the law requires that grand jury proceedings shall be regarded as
privileged communications and that the secrets of the grand jury room shall not be
revealed. The reasons usually given for this requirement are to prevent the escape
of the accused, to secure freedom of deliberation and opinion among the grand
jurors, and to prevent the testimony produced before them from being contradicted
at the trial by subordination or perjury. . . . The rule of secrecy concerning
matters transpiring in the grand jury room is not designed for the protection of wit-
nesses before the grand jury, but for the protection of the grand jurors and in
furtherance of public justice. A witness has no privilege to have his testimony
treated as a confidential communication but must be considered as testifying under
all the obligations of an oath in a judicial proceeding, and hence his testimony
may be disclosed whenever it becomes material to the administration of justice.".
51. General order No. 17, July 14, 1967.
52. Id, at 17, 2(a).
53. Id. at 17, 3.
54. Id, at 17, 5(a).
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(5) The indictment was returned by a Grand Jury which acted contrary to
Article 112 ...and which results in substantial injustice ....
The issue in mandamus5 5 which was to be determined is whether Judge
Power exceeded his jurisdiction in granting the May 17 order to review
in camera5 6 the grand jury or its transcript prior to indictment, or, more
specifically, whether the possibility of substantial injustice would result
from his failure. Barnabas Sears contended that the respondents had
no standing to petition the court as they were not subpoenaed to appear,
which is a requisite to standing, and as such the court's entry of the May
14th order exceeded the court's jurisdiction.
In Application of Iaconi,57 a person not named in a grand jury sub-
poena sought to quash the subpoena requiring other individuals to appear,
to have the proceeding stayed, and to cause the grand jury to refrain from
further investigation of alleged Internal Revenue Service violations until
his case, which was at that time pending in federal court, came to trial.
laconi had no standing as he was not named in a subpoena, but nevertheless
the court stated:
55. The attack on Power's order was made by a writ of mandamus to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Mandamus is a summary extraordinary remedy which is granted
by the Supreme Court to expunge a judgment of a lower court which is void for
want of jurisdiction either of the subject matter, of the parties, or to enter the order
complained of. People ex rel. Koester v. Board of Review, 351 I11. 301, 314, 184
N.E. 325, 330 (1932), where mandamus was used to void an order of the Board
of Review which allowed certain record books, relative to property assessment in
Cook County, to be let out, the court continued: "The writ is not granted as a
matter of absolute right, and will only issue in cases where it appears that under the
law it ought to issue. The court will not order it in doubtful cases." See also
People ex rel. Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Clark, 12 Ill. 2d 515, 519-20,
147 N.E.2d 89, 92-3 (1958), the Illinois Supreme Court stated: "Article VI, Sec-
tion 2 of the Illinois Constitution, S.H.A., confers original jurisdiction on this court
in cases 'in mandamus'. . Where the performance of an official duty or act
involves the exercise of judgment or discretion, the officer's action is not subject to
review or control by mandamus. . . . t]he writ of mandamus will not lie for its
correction if the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties." Also
see People ex rel. Dolan v. Dusler, 411 Ill. 535, 538, 104 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1952),
where mandamus was denied in an appeal to expunge an order reversing a deci-
sion for the detachment of a territory from a community school district because a
writ of error was the proper remedy, the Supreme Court stated: "[M]andamus
is a summary, expeditious and drastic common-law writ of extraordinary character,
sometimes referred to as the highest judicial writ known to law."
56. An in camera review is a "judicial inquiry," Levine v. United States, 362
U.S. 610 (1960), and is a result of the policy of grand jury secrecy. Approval of
this method is noted in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 32 F.R.D. 175, 181 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963), where it is stated: "[I]n camera inspection of secret or confidential
information has been an approved procedural method to protect the rights of a
party, through judicial control, while at the same time preserving the secret and
confidential character of grand jury minutes.
57. 120 F. Supp. 589 (D. Mass. 1954).
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[Any court ...can exercise over a grand jury sitting in that court supervisory
power to prevent . . . that grand jury from being used abusively. . . . [I]n acting
sua sponte in checking abuses of a grand jury, a court may, in substance though
not in form, respond to suggestions made or grievances drawn on its attention by
counsel, litigants or strangers. Thus this Court may, if it sees fit, examine the
application of Frank laconi to see whether the Court finds such an abuse of process
by the Grand Jury as to warrant the Court interfering .... 58
This case demonstrates that standing is not a requirement to make a
charge of abuse of process against a grand jury prior to indictment. 59
In People v. Maslowsky6 ° the abuse of process was not at issue. The
state's attorney attempted to present to the grand jury, recordings of
conversations between petitioner and another individual illegally 61 ob-
tained by means of an electric eavesdropping device, and petitioner sought
to bar their presentation. Although petitioner did have standing, as he
had been subpoenaed, it was immaterial, because "[a]ny evidence obtained
in violation of this Article (on illegal wiretaps) is not admissible in any
civil or criminal trial, or any administrative or legislative inquiry or pro-
ceeding, nor in any grand jury proceedings. '6 2
It is evident from these two cases, and Chapter 38, Sections 112-6(b)
and 114-1(a) 5, that it is within the inherent supervisory power of the
circuit court judge to review in camera the jury or the transcript prior
to indictment, to prevent any abuse of justice, even when no one has
standing to make such claim; and that he can on his own motion, examine
the grand jury in an approved means with regard to abuses in addition
to an abuse of process. It is evident then that Sears' contention as to
petitioners' standing is moot, and since mandamus is a corrective remedy
for an improper assumption of jurisdiction," it was rightly denied.
The next issue arises in response to the May 16, 1971, request by the
58. Id. at 590-91. No abuse of process was shown so Jaconi's application
was denied.
59. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 32 F.R.D. 175, 181 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), where grand jury subpoenas to various General Motors' employees were at-
tacked by G.M., which had no standing, as an abuse of process since their testi-
mony was needed as defense witnesses in a pending action stemming from a prior
grand jury indictment. The court held even absent ". . . locus standi, [it] is suffi-
cient to invoke this court's inherent power to supervise the grand jury so as to pre-
vent the perversion of its process." G.M.'s motion was denied as no abuse of
process was found.
60. 34 Ill. 2d 456, 216 N.E.2d 669 (1966).
61. The recordings were a violation of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1, 14-7
(1965).
62. 34 Ill. 2d 456, 463, 216 N.E.2d 669, 674 (1966), where the court recited
the statute.
63. See discussion of mandamus supra note 55.
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foreman of the grand jury, that jurors be allowed individual in camera
conferences with Judge Power with a court reporter present. This request
was challenged by way of a writ of prohibition64 to the Illinois Supreme
Court. 15 Since at the time of filing this petition for the writ, Judge Power
had not given his response to the foreman's request, its affirmation would
prevent him from exercising jurisdiction to hold these individual in camera
conferences. This petition for prohibition raised the issue whether the
jurisdiction to hold private conferences with individual members is within
the inherent supervisory power of the circuit court judge?
In People v. Strauch66 the defendant challenged the indictment because
the trial judge entered the jury room to instruct the jury as to the law of
criminal libel. The appellate court held that if the judge receives a request
for additional instructions from the grand jury, the proper place for
deliverance is in open court,6 7 where their original charge is delivered.68
In Clinton v. Superior Court,69 petitioner, a grand jury member, had a
matter which he wished to submit to the grand jury. The grand jury
declined to accede, whereupon petitioner sought a writ of mandamus in
the superior court to compel the grand jury to hear his case. In denying
his writ the superior court held that the provisions relating to grand juries,
impose duties .... do not in a legal sense grant any rights either to the grand jury
or to an individual member thereof. The grand jury can only function as a
body. . . . A member of the grand jury is without authority to perform any act
as a grand juror except the performance of those official duties imposed by law
and at a regular and valid session of the grand jury. Beyond that, such member
has no official standing, and, in effect, is a legal non-entity. The grand jury can
function legally only when in official session with a quorum present .... 70
64. "A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial process whereby a su-
perior court may prevent inferior tribunals or persons from exercising a jurisdiction
which they have not been vested by law." People ex rel. Town of Cicero v. Har-
rngton, 21 Ill. 2d 224, 226, 171 N.E.2d 647, 648 (1961). That opinion continued:
"The word 'inferior' as used in this connection does not relate to the intrinsic
quality of the court itself but rather to its relative rank when compared with the
court wherein the writ is sought." See also People ex rel. General Motors v. Bua,
37 111. 2d 180, 192, 226 N.E.2d 6, 13 (1967), where the court stated: "[Tlhe his-
toric extraordinary writ of mandamus is a valuable judicial tool which must be con-
sidered even though some of the normal criteria for its use are absent."
65. The application for the writ in prohibition was filed with the application for
the writ in mandamus.
66. 153 Ill. App. 544 (1910).
67. Id. at 550.
68. The indictment was not quashed because the defendant failed to show that
he was prejudiced by the procedure, and therefore this breach only constituted
harmless error.
69. 23 Cal. App. 2d 342, 73 P.2d 252 (1937).
70. Id. at 345, 73 P.2d at 253-54.
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It is obvious from the holdings of these two cases that the grand jury can
function only as a body, that the individual members are without power
to request individual communication from the circuit court, and where a
valid request for additional information from the court is made, the
judge may only grant this request in open court with the entire grand
jury body present.7 1 To do less would violate the historic independence
and secrecy of the grand jury. It must be realized that there are a
variety of means, within the judge's power to prevent abuses, that do not
violate these principles. 72 In People v. Parker,73 a case concerning an
outside citizen's private communication with a grand jury, it was concluded
that the rule of law which forbids all communication with grand juries, engaged in
criminal investigation, except through the public instructions of courts and the testi-
mony of sworn witnesses, is a rule of safety to the community.74
The case stands for the proposition that the proper channel for the present-
ment of evidence to the grand jury is through the prosecutor, not the
jurors themselves. In light of these historic principles, the Illinois Supreme
Court rightly granted prohibition.
The final issue raised on the charge of contempt appealed to the state
high court, involved Judge Power's April 22 order to Barnabas Sears to
subpoena all witnesses who appeared before the January 1970, federal
grand jury, who had not yet appeared before the state grand jury. The
issue may be stated: Is it within the inherent supervisory power of the
court to direct to a grand jury what evidence or witnesses it will hear, or
does such an action violate the grand jury's independence? 5
"The Grand Jury must hear all evidence presented by the State's
71. See also Hammer v. State, 337 P.2d 1097, 1110 (Okla. Ct. App. 1959),
where the judge with the prosecutor entered the jury room. The court said: "In the
discharge of his official duties, the place for the judge is on the bench ...
. .. [A]fter the grand jury has been duly organized ... they are not subject to
the control of the court ...other than that which they may receive in the charge
of the court before they proceed to enter upon their duties or by instructions sub-
sequently given them in open court."
72. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1952) states:
"There are various methods by which the court may exercise control. An inde-
pendent judiciary has power and authority without negation by higher courts ...
The judge may discharge a grand jury at any time, for any reason or for no rea-
son. . . . He may give instructions which do not constitute precedent. . . . These
may be political manifestos. The court may refuse to authorize expenses ...thus
prevent[ing] the employment of investigators or independent counsel. Finally, it may
discipline the attorneys, the attendants or the grand jurors themselves for breach
of the secrecy. .. "
73. 374 II1. 524, 30 N.E.2d 11 (1940).
74. Id. at 529, 30 N.E.2d at 13-14.
75. Judge Power's order was also attacked on the ground it was given in a closed
door session, a matter previously discussed.
[Vol. XXII
Attorney."'76 If a judge can direct the state's attorney as to what evidence
to present, then he in essence controls the grand jury. If the grand jury
can direct the state's attorney as to what evidence to present, then they
in essence are an independent body. The investigation of this issue must
therefore ascertain whether the grand jury or the court has the authority
over what is to be presented. It has already been noted that the grand
jury is an arm of the court, and is subject to the court's supervisory
power in certain instances. 7  This supervisory power has been extended
to the presentment of evidence in People v. Maskowsky, 78 where the
court forbade the grand jury to hear tapes illegally made.
In contrast to this power are the principles derived from the common
law, going back to the separation of the grand jury from the trial court and
the historic Earl of Shaftsbury79 case. Their place in the present grand
jury scheme is described by Judge Learned Hand in In re Kittle,80 where
in denying a petitioner's request to be discharged from testifying before
a grand jury, because he had no power to interfere with their development
of evidence, he stated,
One purpose of the secrecy of the grand jury's doings is to insure against . . . ju-
dicial control. They are the voice of the community accusing its members ....
Therefore, except in sporadic . . . instances, the courts have never taken supervision
over what evidence shall come before them. .... 81
This policy is reflected in the manner in which evidence may be presented
to the grand jury.5 2 In People ex rel. Ferrill v. Graydon83 the court stated:
The power of the grand jury is not dependent upon the court but is original and
complete, and its duty is to diligently inquire into all offenses which shall come to
its knowledge, whether from the court, the state's attorney, its own members or
from any source, and it may make presentment of its own knowledge without any
instruction or authority from the court. The court cannot limit the scope of the in-
vestigation of the grand jury.8 4
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 112-14(a) (1969).
77. For a good presentation of the court's supervisory power see In re Na-
tional Glassworker, 287 F. 219 (N.D. Ohio 1922).
78. 34 111. 2d 456, 216 N.E.2d 669 (1966).
79. 8 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 759 (1816).
80. 180 F. 946 (S.D. N.Y. 1910).
81. Id. at 947. This proposition might be taken to mean a completely inde-
pendent grand jury, but it was put in proper perspective in In re National Glass-
workers, 287 F. 219 (N.D. Ohio 1922) where the court stated: "In the cases cited,
287 F. 219, 224 (N.D. Ohio 1922), particularly the Kittle and Thompson cases, ex-
pressions may be found which might lead one into the view that the power of the
court to prevent abuse of its process in connection with a grand jury investigation
does not exist. This does not, however, represent the weight of the law."
82. See Justice Field's charge and accompanying material, supra note 43.
83. 333 I11. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929).
84. id. at 433-34, 164 N.E. at 834.
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The line of demarcation between the supervisory power of the court
and the independence of the grand jury are described in Application of
Texas Co.,85 where the applicant sought to quash grand jury subpoenas
and subpoena duces tecum, and to restrain the government from presenting
certain witnesses, as improperly investigating for its then pending trial.
The court in speaking of its control over the grand jury stated:
It is under control by the court to the extent that it is organized and the legality of
its proceedings determined by the court in accordance with the statutes. Its members
are subject to the court's supervision and control for any violation of their duties.
Beyond this supervisory power over them, however, the court cannot limit them in
their legitimate investigation of alleged violations of the law.80
It appears, then, that the court's supervision ends with the presentment of
legal evidence, and the power to direct what evidence shall be presented
rests in the grand jury.
That this evidentiary power operates independently of the court is
exemplified by United States v. Thompson,"7 involving a grand jury in-
vestigation of the mishandling of bank funds. The district attorney
proposed a forty-seven count indictment of the bank's president. The
grand jury decided to indict only on the first seventeen counts. In a
subsequent grand jury proceeding, a United States special assistant was
appointed to work with the district attorney to procure an indictment on
the thirty other counts. Without any court authority, he directed the
grand jury's attention to these counts, and after hearing witnesses the
grand jury voted to indict on these counts. When the indictment was
presented, the court, while expressing doubt as to its validity because the
matter was taken up and evidence presented without court authority,
allowed a motion to quash this indictment. In reversing that ruling the
Court held that,
the power and duty of the grand jury to investigate is original and complete, sus-
ceptible of being exercised upon its own motion and upon such knowledge as it may
derive from any source which it may deem proper, and is not therefore dependent for
its exertion upon the approval or disapproval of the court . . . that the United
States district attorney . . . has the power to present such information without the
previous approval of the court . . . and that by the same token the duty of the
district attorney to direct the attention of a grand jury to crimes . . . is coterminous
with the authority of the grand jury to entertain such charges.S8
The extent to which evidence is solely the grand jury's province is
85. 27 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Il1. 1939).
86. Id. at 850.
87. 251 U.S. 407 (1919).
88. Id. at 413-14.
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demonstrated in State v. Will.8 9 In this case the members of the grand
jury decided they had finished their business, but the trial judge refused
to dismiss them as he felt they had not discharged their duty. He told
them to return to the jury room and hear evidence against the certain
parties who had broken the law, and then entered the grand jury room to
recapitulate his statements. The defendant's motion to quash the indict-
ment, made after the case went to trial, caused the guilty finding to be
reversed. 90 The court stated:
[Aldd to that fact [that he entered the jury room] . . . that he directed the jury
to indict the defendant, and we have a case where not only the province of the
grand jury was improperly invaded, but the discretion and judgment wisely vested
in law in that body is swept away by the positive direction of the judge of the
court, and the will of one man is substituted for and in place of the judgment of
the grand jury . . . to countenance such a proceeding would be to strike a fatal
blow to the grand jury system, would effectively deprive that body of the exclusive
discretion which the law has reposed in them, and instead of leaving them an in-
dependent body, charged with the investigation of crime, and the due presentment
of those who[ml . . . they should deem to be guilty parties, would make them mere
servants of the presiding judge, to register his will regardless of their own judgment.9 '
In ruling on this issue the Illinois Supreme Court enunciated the
principle that "there may be circumstances under which the circuit court
will have jurisdiction to direct that witnesses be subpoenaed to appear
before a grand jury."'92  By making such an unqualified statement the
court has opened the doors to a judicial invasion into the realm of the
grand jury. This holding expressly violates the grand jury's historic
independence and has the potential to make the members "mere servants
of the presiding judge." Of course, the circumstances did not lie here,93
but when would they lie? To overturn such an important touchstone in
our age of political unrest could easily lead to the subversion of the entire
grand jury process, for certainly a blow to their independence as to what
to consider, strikes it at the heart. As it was put by James Alger Fee,
then Chief Judge of Oregon, in United States v. Smyth, 94 in an opinion
which purported to be a "clear and decisive statement of the powers and
duties of the grand jury which will return to the touchstone of funda-
mentals and give a definite guide for the future," 95
89. State v. Will, 97 Iowa 58, 65 N.W. 1010 (1896).
90. Entry into the jury room is not always grounds of reversible error. See
People v. Strauch, 153 Ill. App. 544 (1910).
91. 97 Iowa 58, 66-67, 65 N.W. 1010.
92. People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 17, 273 N.E.2d 380, 389 (1971).
93. Id.
94. 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
95. Id. at 287.
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[Ilt has been held an inviolable tradition that they need follow the orders or in-
structions of the judge neither as to what they consider nor as to whom they indict
or fail to indict. . . . Unquestionably, the grand jury are under no necessity to
follow the orders of the prosecutor. They can present an indictment whether he
will or no [sic]. Indeed, they may make a presentment contrary to the orders of the
judge, the prosecutor for the king or the Chief Executive. 96
I submit it should remain that way.
Paul Shapiro
96. Id. at 293-94.
